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I. INTRODUCTION

The gold standard of admissibility for scientific evidence was laid out
in Frye v. United States in 1923.' Though the Frye standard continues to
be useful to Florida's courts, in light of the extensive judicial recognition
of DNA, this Note argues that a Frye analysis should no longer be
considered the benchmark of admissibility. By contrast, the standards

* Editor's Note: This Note received the Barbara W. Makar Writing Award for the
Outstanding Note for Spring 2006.
** 2006. B.S., Plant Biology, Univ. of Delaware, 2003; J.D., Univ. ofFlorida Levin College
of Law, 2006. Thanks to everyone who believed in me and encouraged me to write this Note.
1. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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actually applied by Florida courts in their purported Frye analyses serve
as a much better assessment of admissibility. Ultimately, a graduation
from the Frye standard is warranted followed by a move towards a more
streamlined approach to admissibility.
Part II of this Note discusses the importance of DNA evidence in
today's criminal justice system and the historical basis for the standards
used in determining admissibility. Part III explores what Florida Courts
understand about the DNA testing process, as expressed in both state and
federal cases from Florida, and educates the reader about the complex
issues surrounding DNA in criminal courts. Parts IV and V explain how
Frye has been used in Florida and suggest that it is applied in name only,
having been informally replaced by more germane standards. Finally, Part
VI outlines the transition from Frye to a more streamlined approach that
should be adopted in Florida.
H. DNA AND THE LEGAL

SYSTEM

A. Science Geeks Have Finally Had Their Day
DNA evidence first gained a considerable amount of attention as
essential evidence in criminal courts in 19972 when the FBI first
announced that their experts could testify that DNA samples could lead to
an exact match. Television has played a large role in DNA's greater
prevalence sparked by the public's interest in the O.J. Simpson trial in
1997' and more recently with the overwhelming popularity of CBS's
"CSI: Crime Scene Investigation."5 The prevalence of shows like "CSI"
has led to what some in the criminal justice community are calling the
"CSI Effect," where jurors are disinclined to make a conviction unless
presented with supporting DNA evidence6 and are predisposed to convict
if there is any supporting DNA evidence.

2. See Jamie Stockwell, Defense, ProsecutionPlay to New 'CSI' Savvy, WASH. POST, May
22, 2005, at AO.
3. Constance Holden, Random Samples:DNA FingerprintingComes ofAge, SCIENCE, Nov.
21, 1997, at 1407.
4. Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA FingerprintingDispute Laid to Rest, 371
NATuRE 735 (1994).
5. Stockwell, supranote 2.
6. Id.(recalling a Maryland jury that "would not convict a man accused of stabbing his
girlfriend to death because a half- eaten hamburger, which was recovered from the crime scene and
assumed to have been his, was not tested for DNA.").
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Beyond providing a powerful tool for prosecutors and presenting a new
hurdle for defense attorneys, this phenomenon has given new hope to
those in jail and on death row who believe that post-conviction DNA
testing will ultimately prove their innocence.7 The Innocence Project, a
nonprofit organization started by lawyers in 1992,8 has in large part led
this movement. One of the first death row inmates exonerated by DNA
evidence was Kirk Bloodsworth who was convicted of raping and
murdering a 9 year old girl in 1985.9 His conviction was founded on the
testimony of five witnesses who all claimed they saw Bloodsworth with
the victim. 0 However, with the help of the Innocence Project,
Bloodsworth was able to show the court the "signature differences"
between his DNA and the DNA isolated from the semen found on the
victim's underwear, thereby proving he was not the aggressor." Since
Bloodsworth was freed, there have been over 190 exonerations from postconviction DNA testing.12
DNA evidence carries with it a strong capacity for persuasion, 3 and the
U.S. Supreme Court has taken notice. In January 2006, the Court heard
oral arguments in House v. Bell 4 to determine whether new DNA
evidence, not available to the trial court in 1985, was sufficient to warrant
a new trial for the appellant, Paul House.' 5 House was sentenced to death
by a Tennessee jury for murdering a woman after luring her from her
home to rape her. 6 The evidence used to convict House was largely
circumstantial, 17 and the prosecution relied heavily on the appellant's
alleged sexual motive for the crime.' 8 House wants a new jury to hear that

7. See Amanda Schaffer, Solving Puzzles With Body Partsas the Pieces,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 2006, at F3.
8. Id. The Innocence Project was founded by Peter J. Neufeld and Barry C. Scheck.
9. Id. See also Bloodsworth v. State, 543 A.2d 382 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
10. Schaffer, supra note 7.
11. Id.
12. Innocence Project Web Site, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 17,2007).
13. See, e.g., Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1117 (Fla. 2006) (Anstead, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "[w]ith the possible exception of DNA evidence, the
confession of another person raises the most compelling and fundamental doubt about a prior
determination of guilt.").
14. 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006).
15. Warren Richey, Should DNA Results Lead to New Trials?, CHRISTIAN SC. MONrrOR,
Jan. 11, 2006, at 2.
16. House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 670-73 (6th Cir. 2004) (Though tests were performed on
the semen stains found on the victim's nightgown, they were identified only to the extent that they
were "from a male secretor of the same general type as appellant [House].").
17. Id. at 673.
18. Id. at 685.
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DNA evidence proves that the semen found on the victim belonged to her
husband and not from House.' 9 This case is significant because it marks
the first time the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the question of
whether post-conviction DNA testing will substantiate a claim for a new
trial.2°
House's claim rests on the Court's interpretation of the test outlined in
Schlup v. Delo2' as applied to the reliability of exculpatory scientific
evidence. In meeting this burden, House showed "that it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of
the new evidence. 22 In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, Justice Kennedy explained that while this was not "a
case of conclusive exoneration," the new DNA evidence, along with other
testimony, was substantial enough to create reasonable doubt in a jury
sufficient to warrant a remand. 23 The Court's determination of the
persuasive power of DNA on a jury will afford House one more chance to
prove that he is innocent.24
Even if House succeeds, his work will not be over. Now that House
gets his day in court, he will still have to convince a judge that the DNA
evidence is admissible as determined by standards established in either
26
Frye v. United States25 or Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals.
B. From the Twilight Zone,27 A StandardEmerges
Frye v. United States, decided in 1923, is the seminal case for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.28 In Frye, the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia held that the scientific principles
underlying the systolic blood pressure deception test (a lie detector test)
had not yet gained "general acceptance" with physiologists and

19. Id. at 68 1. See also Charles Lane, CourtMay Revise Rule on Death Row Appeals, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2005, at A03.
20. Richey, supra note 15.
21. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
22. Id. at 327.
23. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2086-87 (2006).
24. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently decided another case involving the importance of
DNA evidence, Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006). See Warren Richey, If Judges
Screen Evidence, is the Jury Usurped?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 22, 2006, at 3.
25. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
26. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
27. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 ("Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidentiary force of the principle must be recognized").
at 1013-14.
28. See id.

2007] BLINDED BY SCIENCE. DOES THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE WARRANT

97

psychologists "as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony
deduced" from the test.29 The circuit court felt that because the test was
based on experimental scientific theories and outside the "common
experience" of the jury, expert testimony on the test results should not be
admitted into evidence.3 ° The general acceptance test in Frye, used to
determine admissibility of new or novel scientific and technical evidence,
remains good law in a number of jurisdictions. 1
Most of the jurisdictions that no longer follow Frye instead adopt the
32 In Daubert,
test laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
petitioners sued the manufacturer of the drug Bendectin, and alleged that
the Bendectin they ingested during their pregnancies caused birth defects
in their babies. 33 Petitioners' experts, relying on recalculations of
previously published epidemiological studies in reaching their conclusion,
testified that Bendectin could have caused the birth defects. 34 Holding this
evidence inadmissible, the Court announced that Frye would be
superseded by a new standard of admissibility based primarily on Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 35 The Daubert criteria, though not a
"definitive checklist or test,' ' 36 are: "whether a theory or technique... can
be (and has been) tested," "whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication," what the "known or potential
rate of error" is, and whether there is "general acceptance" in the "relevant

29. Id. at 1014.
30. Id.
31. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-DaubertStandardsforAdmissibility ofScientific and
Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453, § 28-43 (2005).
32. Id. § 2 (noting that "[t]wenty-five states have affirmatively adopted the Daubert or similar
test for use in their courts ...Fifteen states and the District of Columbia adhere to Frye... Six
states have not wholly rejected Frye, but apply the Daubert factors .. .and four states have
developed their own tests.").
33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
34. Id. at 583.
35. Id.at 589-94. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (2006).
Testimony by Experts. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
36. Daubert,509 U.S. at 593.
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scientific community."" The DaubertCourt emphasized that this standard
would focus courts on the relevance and reliability of the new or novel38
science underlying the evidence.39
Although the Supreme Court of Florida has specifically endorsed the
Frye test over Daubertand Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,40
some scholars suggest that Florida courts have adopted a standard for
novel scientific evidence that is much closer to the Daubertcriteria than
to the Frye test.41 In analyzing the Florida Supreme Court's 2001 decision
in Ramirez v. State,42 Professor Barnes observed that the primary
difference between the court's alleged "Frye" analysis and the Daubert
standard was the substitution of the general acceptance test with the
requirement of "scientific soundness."43 Since the application of this
"Frye-Plus" test in Ramirez, Florida Courts have reaffirmed their
reliance on the Frye test while simultaneously including criteria from
Daubertand Ramirez in their analysis.4a
The standards by which a court measures the admissibility of a
scientific technique has a profound impact on the execution of the

37. Id. at 593-94.
38. Id. at 593 n. 11 (stating that though Frye focused on novel scientific techniques, the Court
does not suggest such narrow application of the standards. "Indeed, theories that are so firmly
established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics,
properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.").
39. Id. at 594-95.
40. Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993).
41. See generally David W. Barnes, GeneralAcceptance Versus Scientific Soundness: Mad
Scientists in the Courtroom, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 303 (2004) (tracing, in great detail, the
similarities between the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Ramirez v. State (Ramirez III), 810
So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2001), and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Daubert).
42. Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836,853 (Fla. 2001) (holding that knife mark identification
evidence was not admissible under Frye to establish a knife as the murder weapon because the
technique had not gained the "imprimatur of science.").
43. Barnes, supra note 41, at 332.
44. Id. at310-11.
45. See, e.g., Bevil v. State, 875 So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (applying Frye,
peer review and publication, and inquiring about validation studies to test the FDLE database);
Magaletti v. State, 847 So. 2d 523, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (using Frye and the "four-step
inquiry" used in Ramirez v. State (Ramirez II), 651 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 1995). A court must
determine whether: 1) expert testimony will assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in
determining a fact in issue; 2) the expert's testimony is based on a scientific principle or discovery
that is "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs" under the Frye test; and 3) the particular expert witness is qualified to render an opinion
on the subject in issue. 4) If the trial court's answer to the first three questions is in the affirmative,
then the expert may testify at trial and the jury can assess the expert's credibility and determine
whether to accept or reject his or her opinion.
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"gatekeeping role for the judge."46 This is a heavy burden, and it is
compounded when dealing with the admissibility of DNA evidence. As
applied to DNA, both the Frye and Daubertstandards require significant
judgment calls on evidentiary submissions that often strain the court's area
of expertise.47
M. A PROFILE

OF FLORIDA CASES

In 1953, researchers James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the
structure of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) and further proposed that it
possessed the mechanism for copying genetic material.48 Before this
breakthrough, scientists commonly believed that proteins contained our
genetic material.49 Fifty years later, scientists have mapped the human
genome,5 ° media coverage and political debate regarding stem cell
research is rampant, 5 and DNA evidence plays a leading role in many
criminal trials.52 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect that courts
should take judicial notice5 3 of DNA evidence as being scientifically sound
or as being generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
However, when considering the admissibility of DNA evidence, most
courts still apply some criteria from either Frye or Daubert54-tests for the
admissibility of new or novel scientific evidence.
Florida courts, adhering loosely to the Frye test55 when determining the
admissibility of DNA, are no exception in their treatment of DNA
evidence as new or novel. However, it would be a mistake to interpret this
46. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
47. See Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla. 1997).
48. J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structurefor
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid (reprinted from NATURE, Apr. 25, 1953), 224 NATURE 470-71 (1969).
Though there is considerable historical debate that the findings of Watson and Crick were based
on the work of others, most notably Rosalind Franklin and Maurice Wilkins, Watson and Crick are
generally given credit for the discovery.
49. See Human Genome Project Information Web Site, http://doegenomes.org (last visited
Feb. 16, 2007).
50. Id.
51. See Norimitsu Onishi, In a Country that CravedRespect, Stem Cell Scientist Rode a
Wave of Pride,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, at A12.
52. Stockwell, supra note 2.
53. FED. R. EvID. 201(b) (2006) ("A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned."). See supratext accompanying note 37.
54. See Lustre, supra note 31, § 2.
55. Barnes, supra note 41, at 310.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

prudence as an indication that judges do not understand the science
underlying DNA testing. In fact, judges are well-versed in the science and
techniques employed by the forensic analysts who test DNA and testify to
those results.
In Brim v. State, the Florida Supreme Court divided the DNA testing
process into two distinct steps in an attempt to simplify the issues
surrounding DNA. 6 The first step "relies upon principles of molecular
biology and chemistry" to determine whether two DNA samples match. 7
The second step relies on statistics in order to give quantitative
significance to a match.58 By dividing the issues, the court hoped to clarify
the two major portions of the DNA testing process that must satisfy Frye. 9
A. "Science! It's Poetry In Motion. ,60
The first step of DNA testing is where most of the science takes place,
and interestingly, where courts display the greatest degree of
understanding and acceptance. There are two main types of DNA used in
forensic DNA analysis: 6' nuclear DNA (nucDNA), found in the nucleus
of all cells, and mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), found within the cell in
organelles called mitochondria.62 While nucDNA can be extracted from
blood, semen, skin cells, and even saliva (mainly from cheek cells),
mtDNA is used when the only sample is a shaft of hair, which contains no
nucDNA. 63 Due to recent advances in technology, DNA can be collected
from even smaller samples of cellular material found at a crime scene. 6'
56. Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 269-70 (Fla. 1997).
57. Id. at 269.
58. Id. at 269-70.
59. Id. at 270 (stating that both steps must satisfy Frye).
60. THOMAS DoLBY, She Blinded Me With Science, on THE GOLDEN AGE OF WIRELESS
(Capitol Records 1990).
61. A third type, Y-chromosome DNA, is used mainly in determining paternity. Wikipedia,
Y-STR, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Y-STR (giving a definition for a Y-STR) (as of Feb. 1, 2007,
16:58 EST).
62. Magaletti v. State, 847 So. 2d 523, 525 n.3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (dealing with the
admissibility of mtDNA).
63. Id. at 527. Also, mtDNA can be extracted from a single hair that has been subjected to
extreme cold or heat, or that is old and degraded. Id.See also M.R. Wilson et al., Extraction, PCR
Amplification andSequencingofMitochondrialDNAfromHuman HairShafts, 18 BIOTECHNIQUES,
662 (1995).
64. Wilson et al., supranote 63. See also Brim v. State (Brim II), 779 So. 2d 427,438 (2000)
(on remand) (noting that the polymerase chain reaction technique (PCR) allows for the extraction
of DNA from smaller samples); Holden, supranote 3 ("[in] the late 1980s and early 1990s... you
really needed a hearty sample, like a quarter-size. Now we're talking nanograms. You can swab
a drinking glass and get saliva cells").
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Regardless of the type of DNA collected, the testing process requires
extraction of DNA from the sample65 and isolation of regions of the DNA
molecule that are unique between individuals.66 Once in the lab, the DNA
sample is broken up by enzymes that cut the DNA molecule at
predetermined regions and are then isolated from the rest of the sample.67
Scientists choose these enzymes because they cut the DNA molecule at the
predetermined regions called polymorphic sites.6" These polymorphic
sites, which account for most of the genetic variability in humans,6 9 serve
as points of comparison between DNA samples. Each polymorphic site is
composed of a DNA sequence (allele) unique in length to the individual.70
There are many different possible alleles at a given locus (location of a
polymorphic site), and the specific alleles at each locus comprise the DNA
profile, or fingerprint, unique to an individual.7'
Once these individual DNA segments are isolated from the sample
found at the crime scene, they are each copied and multiplied using a
technique called polymerase chain reaction (PCR).72 PCR is based on the
DNA replication process used naturally by the cells in our body.73 In short,
PCR allows scientists to perform a series of steps in which each DNA
segment is copied repeatedly. Think of it as a loudspeaker for DNA-PCR
amplifies each DNA segment many times over until the amount of DNA
has grown exponentially. 74 Whereas with older technology a relatively
large sample had to be collected in order to extract enough DNA to create
a visible profile,75 PCR allows a large amount of pure DNA to be
reproduced from a tiny drop of blood or a single hair. 76 Through PCR, a
pure sample of each allele is obtained, from both the samples collected at

65. Brim I, 779 So. 2d at 438-39.
66. See United States v. Gaines, 979 F. Supp. 1429, 1431 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
67. Brim II, 779 So. 2d at 438-39.
68. Id. at 440.
69. See Gaines, 979 F. Supp. at 1431 ("Although 99.9% of human DNA does not vary from
person to person, no two persons other than identical twins have the same DNA." (quoting United
States v. Shea, 957 F. Supp. 331, 333 (D.N.H. 1997))).
70. Id. at 1431-32.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1432.
73. See id.
74. Gaines, 979 F. Supp. at 1432-33.
75. Brim v. State, 779 So. 2d 427 at 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
76. Stockwell, supra note 2.
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a crime scene and known samples collected directly from the victim and
suspected perpetrators.77
Next, a tangible DNA profile, or fingerprint, is created from the
amplified samples. 78 This is accomplished by placing each allele from a
sample into a lane in a sheet of specialized gel through which an electric
current is run, a process called electrophoresis. 79 Because DNA has a
negative chemical charge,8" and each allele has a specific length, each
allele is drawn through the sieve-like gel at a different rate. 8' Since each
lane carries a different allele, after a set length of time, electrophoresis
results in distinct bands of DNA in each lane of the gel sheet.82 After all
of the samples undergo electrophoresis, the resulting pattern of DNA
bands is transferred to film, which is then processed and developed.83 Once
the film is developed, the samples can be compared for a match,84 and the
first step of the DNA testing process is complete.
B. "It Was A Million-to-OneShot, Doc., Million to One. "85
According to Brim v. State, the second step when testing DNA for
forensic purposes is statistical, giving quantitative meaning to the
probability that two DNA samples, if selected randomly, would match.86
Without some "expert guidance," the probative value of the similarities
between two samples is minimal. 87 Also, presenting statistical probabilities
of a random match between samples without expert interpretation of
relevance is "meaningless., 88 For example, if Florida's jury hears that the
chance of randomly selecting a similar DNA profile to the one found at a
crime scene would be 1 in 2.7 billion and hears that Florida's population
is less than 15 million, the jury could easily infer guilt.89 However, for a
defendant, it is crucial that the jury understand that the FBI does not

77. See id.
78. Id. at 439.
79. Id.
80. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 848 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
81. Id.
82. Brim II, 779 So. 2d at 439.
83. Andrews, 553 So. 2d at 848. The DNA is first transferred to a nylon membrane, then
subjected to radioactive probes which transfer the image of the DNA bands to X-ray film, which
is then developed. See id.
84. Id.
85. Seinfeld: The Fusilli Jerry (NBC television broadcast Apr. 27, 1995).
86. Brim, 695 So. 2d at 270.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See Brim v. State (Brim II), 779 So. 2d 427, 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (on remand).
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endorse a "positive identification" from statistics unless the random match
probability is at least 1 in 260 billion.9"
So where do these numbers come from? As the Supreme Court of
Florida in Butler v. State91 explained: "To estimate the frequency of a
suspect's overall DNA pattern, the individual allele frequencies are
multiplied together, using a multiplication or product rule, to compute an
aggregate estimate of the probability that this combination of alleles in the
suspect's DNA sample would be encountered in a particular racial
population."92 Using the example of rolling dice, this is the same simple
math used to find the chance that two six-sided dice will land on the same
number when thrown, which is 1 in 36, or 1/6 X 1/6. 9'
The FBI,94 Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE),9" and
Miami-Dade Police Department 96 have all compiled databases comprising
thousands of known DNA profiles. Using the product rule described
above, experts are able to determine the frequency of the alleles found in
a crime scene sample to those in the general population.97 This is done by
comparing how frequently each sample allele is found at corresponding
loci of the profiles in the database. 98 For example, if locus 1 of the sample
has an allele, X, that is found in 3 out of 100 of the corresponding loci in
the database, that allele would be given a 3% frequency. This frequency
would then be multiplied by the frequencies of all the other alleles in the
profile, resulting in an estimate of the overall frequency of the profile in
the population. This is what the DNA expert will testify to during trial, 99
assuming that the court admits the DNA results into evidence.
The process of collecting and analyzing DNA evidence is complex, but
not unmanageable. Florida's courts have grappled with the admissibility
of DNA evidence for almost thirty years' and have admitted DNA

90. Id. at 445 n.48 (noting that 260 billion is many times more than the population of Earth).
91. 842 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2003).
92. Id. at 829 n.6 (quoting United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 1993)).
93. Brim I, 779 So. 2d at 445.
94. Id. at 437.
95. Bevil v. State, 875 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
96. Perdomo v. State, 829 So. 2d 280, 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
97. Brim II, 779 So. 2d at 443.
98. Id. at 442-46.
99. See Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 152 (Fla. 2002) (summarizing testimony given by
the state's DNA expert).
100. See Magaletti v. State, 847 So. 2d 523, 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); see generallyAndrews
v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Andrews was one of the first Florida cases to address
DNA admissibility.
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evidence in numerous cases.'' But has Frye outlived its usefulness to
Florida's courts as the applicable standard of admissibility?

IV. WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY'

°2

When it comes to DNA evidence, the gatekeeping role of the judge is
no easy task. Judges have expressed the need for experts to help them
digest the technical scientific literature behind the DNA testing process0 3
and have even admitted to the risk of getting stuck on "auto pilot" when
dealing with hard scientific issues."° Though Florida courts are well
versed in the science and procedures involved in the DNA testing
process,'0 5 there is still a need to thoroughly screen such evidence to
prevent prejudice to the defendant and to counter the "CSI Effect."
Frye applies to new or novel scientific techniques and the opinions of
expert witnesses generated therefrom.0 6 The test serves to prevent jurors
from being influenced by the "aura of infallibility"' °7 surrounding expert
witnesses who testify based on experimental and unproven scientific
discoveries.' Bad science and bad experts lead to bad testimony while
still carrying a dangerous tendency to prejudice the party against whom
the evidence is offered. 0 9 Regardless of the attention DNA has received
in popular culture, the fundamental science underlying the testing
procedures remains outside the common experience of most jurors."0

101. Magaletti,847 So. 2d at 527. Recently, the Florida Supreme Court of Florida referenced
DNA evidence admitted by lower courts with no discussion concerning standards for admissibility,
or whether the Frye test was even used. See, e.g., Ballard v. State, 923 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2006);
Seibert v. State, 923 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2006); Snelgrove v. State, 921 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2005);
Mansfield v. State, 911 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 2005).
102. SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002).
103. Brim II, 779 So. 2d at 429-30.
104. Stockwell, supra note 2 (quoting Circuit Judge C. Phillip Nichols of Prince George's
County, MD.).
105. See discussion supraPart III.
106. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
107. In re Amber B., 191 Cal. App. 3d 682, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting People v.
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1984).
108. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
109. See, e.g., Bevil v. State, 875 So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Fla. Ist DCA 2004) (holding that it was
not harmless error where the State did not carry its Frye burden, but nevertheless used statistics to
convince jurors "that it was scientifically impossible for anyone other than [the] appellant to have
committed the crimes").
110. Stockwell, supranote 2 ("Your average citizen sees that kind of stuff on 'CSI' and says,
'I know you can do that. I see it on TV.' But on television, they take a long shot case and in a
matter of hours, a good result is available.").
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Though Frye applies only to new or novel techniques, the standard
continues to provide guidance, however limited, to courts that question a
technique's admissibility."'
The threshold question for application of Frye, however, is not whether
a scientific technique is new or novel, but whether it has been subjected to
Frye criteria in the legal community." 2 In Williams v. State, the district
court addressed whether the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test (HGN), a
sobriety test based on the eye's response to movement when a person is
intoxicated, need undergo a Frye hearing before the results could be
admitted into evidence." 3 Because HGN had "met the Frye test in other
legal jurisdictions" and had been found to be generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community, the court held that a reapplication of the
Frye test was not warranted." 4 Therefore, the court required a proper
foundation that the "test was correctly administered by a qualified
[expert]""' before admitting the evidence. In doing so, the district court
sought to avoid the "needless waste of judicial resources on sufficiently
established principles."' 6 Once the technique passes the rigor of the Frye
test, it is7no longer new or novel, and the focus of the admissibility inquiry
shifts. 1
The Third District Court of Appeals, in State v. Meador,explained this
shift." 8 When Frye is no longer applicable, the admissibility of scientific
evidence is proper after demonstrating the general reliability of the
technique, the qualifications of the experts, and an explanation of the
results."19 The use of these "traditional predicates"' 12' does not suggest that
the general acceptance requirement ofFrye is unimportant, but rather that
when dealing with established scientific techniques,"'2 general acceptance
serves more as a starting point for a showing of reliability than ultimate
111. See Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1197-98 (Fla. 2005).
112. Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 24, 30-31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
113. Id.at 26-28. HGN detects "rapid involuntary horizontal oscillation of the eyes when
attempting to follow a target moved from side to side." Id. at 27 n.4. By observing a person's
reaction to the test, the administering officer can determine if the individual's blood alcohol content
is greater than. 10 percent, the legal limit. See id at 29.
114. Id.at32.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 31.
117. State v. Meador, 674 So. 2d 826, 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (addressing the admissibility
of HGN, and finding that there is a consensus that the test "is an established method to detect the
presence of alcohol").
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Williams, 710 So. 2d at 31.
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proof of reliability.' 22 A proper showing of the predicate reasons for
admissibility is still required to prevent unfair prejudice to the defendant.
If the DNA testing process has been subjected to the rigors of Frye,
both Williams and Meador suggest that while general acceptance of the
forensic DNA analysis is still relevant, the Frye test should no longer be
the linchpin standard of admissibility.'23 In practice, however, Florida's
affinity to Frye has resulted in the repeated application of the Frye test to
DNA in Florida's courts.
In 1996, the Florida Supreme Court, in Brim v. State, divided the DNA
testing process into two main steps: the scientific testing of the samples
and the statistical analysis of the results.' 24 Additionally, the Court
required that both steps satisfy the Frye test.'25
As to the first step, the Court noted that in 1995, it took judicial notice
that the science of the DNA testing process, if properly conducted, would
satisfy Frye.12 6 On remand, the Second District Court of Appeals held that
the DNA evidence satisfied Frye and mentioned specifically that the
ladder (relating to electrophoresis) and probes (referring to the loci tested)
used also satisfied Frye.'27
In 2001, the Third District Court of Appeals, in Lemour v. State,
concluded that the PCR method was generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community after having passed the Frye test.'28 The general
acceptance of PCR was confirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in
2005.129

Further, the Second District Court of Appeals, in Magaletti v. State,
made clear that the first step of DNA testing, including extraction,

122. See Meador, 674 So. 2d at 835-36 (determining that HGN test results were not
admissible, not because HGN was not generally accepted, but because proper predicate was not
satisfied, it had not been "properly administered and interpreted").
123. See also Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 844 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (criticizing Frye
as being "too inflexible" because it requires courts to wait until a technique is generally accepted.
This results in a "cultural lag" which might exclude evidence that "could be completely reliable.").
124. See discussion supraPart III.
125. Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla. 1997).
126. Id. at 271.
127. Brim v. State, 827 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
128. Lemour v. State, 802 So. 2d 402,404-06 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (the district court approved
both PCR in general and also PCR when used to amplify DNA segments called short tandem
repeats (STR)).
129. Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1198 n.3 (Fla. 2005) (citing Lemour, 802 So. 2d at 404-
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replication, and sequencing, has been "scientifically
validated and used by
13
researchers... since the 1970s and 1980s. 0
Concerning the second step, the Florida Supreme Court, in Brim,
remanded the case for a Frye hearing on the general acceptance of the
product rule in determining population frequency statistics as a result of
recent advances in statistical analysis."'3 On remand, the district court held
that the product rule was properly admitted as was the FBI database used
in the statistical analysis. 3 2 In 2003, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed
the general acceptance of the product
rule in statistical analysis both in
133
Florida and other jurisdictions.
DNA evidence has passed the rigor of the Frye test in Florida for more
than a decade, yet courts still generally adhere to Frye. 34 When dealing
with DNA evidence, however, the Frye test is applied in name only.
V. WOULD A FRYE BY ANY OTHER NAME SMELL

As

SWEET?

General acceptance in the scientific community is an important factor
when determining the admissibility of DNA evidence, but in light of
Williams and Meador, general acceptance is a starting point, not the finish
line for DNA admissibility. Because DNA evidence tends to be more
complex than other forms of forensic evidence, 135 a graduation from
Frye's inflexibility is warranted. Appropriately, Florida's courts have
moved beyond the basic Frye requirements and have adopted admissibility
standards that dig deeper toward the reliability of DNA evidence. The
following cases track the standards actually applied in assessing the
admissibility of DNA evidence in Florida.
In 1988, the appellate court in Andrews v. State addressed the
admissibility of DNA identification evidence-a topic that no U.S.
130. Magaletti v. State, 847 So. 2d 523,527 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (though dealing with mtDNA
and not nucDNA, the lab methods used are analogous).
131. Brim, 695 So. 2d at 273-75 (reasoning that due to the recent publication of the 1996 NRC
report discussing the use of the product rule and declaring the conservative "ceiling principles" no
longer necessary).
132. Brim, 827 So. 2d at 260 (holding the DNA evidence was properly admitted, and the
associated concerns were rendered moot after the Frye hearing and the Florida Supreme Court
decision in Darlingv. State, 808 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2002)).
133. Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 829 (Fla. 2003) (quoting, e.g., Clark v. State, 679 So. 2d
321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) ("'product rule calculations are appropriate as a matter of scientific fact
and law.'")). The FDLE database has also been Frye tested and found to be generally accepted. See
Darling,808 So. 2d at 158-60.
134. Ibar v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 149 (Fla. 2006).
135. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
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appellate court had ever addressed in criminal cases. 136 In determining the
admissibility of DNA evidence, the court looked at several factors: 1)
Whether DNA test results would be helpful to the jury; 2) Whether there
had been any relevant extrajudicial use of the technique; 3) Whether there
was scientific literature dealing with DNA testing; and 4) Whether the
frequency of the test led to erroneous results.' Finding sufficient
evidence of these factors, the court concluded that "[i]n contrast to
evidence derived from hypnosis, truth serum and polygraph, evidence
derived from DNA print identification appears based on proven scientific
principles. ' ' 138 Particularly compelling was the finding that DNA testing
had been conducted in labs around the world for approximately ten years
and had been utilized in diagnosis, treatment, and research for genetically
inherited diseases.139 The Andrews court adopted a relevancy standard in
favor of the Frye test,"4 though the circuit court noted that the DNA
evidence presented would pass Frye as well.' 4 '
In determining general acceptance, a common and useful form of
supporting evidence comes from publications both scientific and legal.'42
For example, in Lemour v. State, the court looked to relevant scientific and
forensic literature as well as to other courts that admitted DNA evidence
to determine whether general acceptance had been attained.'43
Furthermore, the court, in Collier v. State, restated the need for legal
opinions supporting general acceptance in addition to the testimony of the
DNA expert.'" Thus, courts have recognized the need for "independent
evidence"' 45 to assist in determining a technique's general acceptance.
It is also apparent that courts should question the reliability of the
techniques used in each case especially if the state has not carried its

136. Id. at 850 n.10.
137. Id. at 849-50.
138. Id. at 850.
139. Id. at 849.
140. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 846-47 (explaining that the Frye standard, as applied at the time,
required a "nose counting" of experts to determine general admissibility, and may therefore,
exclude evidence that is otherwise reliable) (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238
(3d Cir. 1985)).
141. Id. at 847 n.6 (discussing that both standards apply, "pending a definitive interpretation
by our supreme court.").
142. See discussion supraPart II. See generallyDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579
(1993).
143. Lemour v. State, 802 So. 2d 402, 405-06 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
144. Collier v. State, 857 So. 2d 943, 945-46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
145. Id. at 945.
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burden of proof' 4 6 In Hayes v. State,147 the Florida Supreme Court
suggested that while DNA evidence was not new or novel, it should
nonetheless be "evaluated on a case by case basis.' 48 Here, the Florida
49
court took judicial notice that DNA evidence is generally reliable.'
Though in affirming that the DNA evidence was admissible, the Florida
court expressed concern that the implemented laboratory testing
procedures implemented had failed to protect against false readings and
sample contamination.'
If the testing procedures are not properly
conducted, the results will not be reliable and therefore, should not be
admitted.
5 2
Additionally, the courts in Bevil v. State'' and Magaletti v. State
looked at whether the procedures, techniques,5 3 and the database used' 54
had undergone validation studies, which "facilitate uniformity, monitor
consistency and... ensure that results are reproducible.""' These studies
help a court
determine if it can trust the laboratory and statistical
56
procedures.
When technicians and experts do not follow these established
procedures, courts are not likely to trust the results. In Murray v. State, the
Florida Supreme Court held DNA test results inadmissible where the
testifying technician admitted that he failed to follow lab procedures, did
not properly document certain steps, was "sloppy[,]" and performed
"below standards."' 57 Further, in United States v. Gaines, the court held
that DNA evidence can be challenged by a showing that "'a scientifically
sound methodology has been undercut by sloppy handling of the samples,

146. Ramirez v. State (Ramirez 1i), 651 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995) (requiring a showing
by the preponderance of the evidence of general acceptance).
147. Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1995).
148. Id. at 264 (noting that this "extremely important new identification technique" was based
on "evolving" technology). The Florida court relied on the findings of the National Research
Council's 1992 report, which was being updated at the time. The 1996 NRC report laid to rest
many of the concerns expressed in the 1992 report. See generally Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268
(Fla. 1997) (discussing some of the differences between the 1992 and 1996 NRC reports,
specifically the shift from the more conservative "ceiling principle" in 1992 to the product rule in
1996, which is now considered the appropriate standard).
149. Id. at 264-65.
150. Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 264-65.
151. Bevil v. State, 875 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
152. Magaletti v. State, 847 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
153. Id. at 527 n.5.
154. Bevil, 875 So. 2d at 1268-69.
155. Magaletti, 847 So. 2d at 527 n.5.
156. See supra text accompanying note 122.
157. Murray v. State, 838 So. 2d 1073, 1081 (Fla. 2002).
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failure to properly train those performing the testing, [and a] failure to
follow appropriate protocols."1 5 8 In these cases, the courts are not

suggesting that the DNA testing is not generally accepted, but rather, if the
tests are not carefully performed, the results will not be accepted as
reliable evidence. 159
Not only must the tests be conducted in order to produce reliable
results, but the individual testifying to the results of the tests must be
qualified. In Everett v. State, the Florida Supreme Court investigated the
background of the state's DNA expert to ensure she was qualified to
testify on the population frequencies as they related to the evidence at
issue. 6 ° The Florida Supreme Court held that to be qualified the expert
must demonstrate a "'sufficient knowledge of the database grounded in the
study of authoritative sources.""6I Specifically, the court looked at the
expert's work experience, training, attendance of courses and conferences,
previous experience testifying as a DNA expert, whether the tests were
reviewed by others, and how concise the testimony would be. 162 Satisfied
with the answers to this inquiry, the Florida Supreme Court found no error
in the trial court's decision to admit expert testimony that the probability
of randomly finding another person with the same DNA profile was 1 in
15.1 quadrillion.1 63 Had the court not felt comfortable with the state's
demonstration of expertise," this evidence likely would not have been
admitted. 165 Determining the qualifications
of the expert to testify is the
166
bottleneck of admissibility analysis.

158. United States v. Gaines, 979 F. Supp. 1429,1433 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (quoting United States
v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1996)).
159. Cf Yisrael v. State, 827 So. 2d 1113, 1114-15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that because
the DNA was tested with a scientifically reliable test kit with general acceptance, the results of the
test kit were also admissible under Frye).
160. Everett v. State, 893 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 2004).
161. Id. at 1281 (quoting Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 828 (Fla. 1997)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1281-82.
164. See Perdomo v. State, 829 So. 2d 280, 283-84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (an example of the
state not meeting its burden to show that the expert was qualified).
165. See, e.g., Miles v. State, 694 So. 2d 151, 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (remanded for a Frye
hearing on the issue of expert's qualifications); Murray v. State, 838 So. 2d 1073, 1081-82 (Fla.
2002) (reversing the convictions of first-degree murder, burglary with assault, and sexual battery
because, among other things, the state did not meet its burden in proving the witness was qualified
as an expert).
166. Courts should not take this step lightly, because when dealing with DNA and statistics,
unqualified witnesses can cause confusion in the courtroom. See, e.g., Miles, 694 So. 2d at 152 n. 1.
The expert testified:
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Considering how Florida's courts actually approach DNA evidence, it
seems logical that the Frye test has been supplanted by the preceding
cases, which outline a broader array of in-depth questions affecting
admissibility. It also seems likely that the court would be in favor of
departing from the requirements of Frye where the evidence is not new or
novel as is the case with DNA.
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MORE STREAMLINED APPROACH

It is counterintuitive that courts still frame the issue in terms of a Frye
requirement As suggested by Williams and Meador,'6 7 a determination
that DNA is no longer new or novel should translate into a simpler test for
admissibility. Though in practice, the standards actually applied tend to
broaden rather than narrow the inquiry. The development ofjudicial tests
should make the application of the law to a specific issue more efficient.
A departure from Frye is especially warranted considering that Frye
testing consumes a great deal of judicial time and resources. 6 The Frye
test requires that the proponent of the evidence "prove [by a
preponderance of the evidence] the general acceptance of both the
underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply the
principle to the facts at hand.' 69 Frye hearings are held before the
evidence is presented to the jury, generally in lengthy pre-trial
conferences, 70 which is by no means a light task.
So, what we do is we have, we would go out and test 100 or 200 individuals and
find out how often a specific type occurs like the one type of DQ Alpha 1.2, 2. We
would just go out and test and see how often it occurs. Each one would do that.
We can multiply that together because they are inherited separately, they're not
linked, and when you multiply that number together you find out what the
frequency is.
Id.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 106-34. See also U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823
So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002) (determining that the "extrapolation" method utilized by experts to
conclude that chronic exposure to pesticides caused the claimant's condition. "By definition, the
Frye standard only applies when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new
or novel scientific techniques. Therefore, in the vast majority of cases, no Frye inquiry will be
required-because no innovative scientific theories will be at issue.").
168. Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 24, 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (the district court sought to
avoid the "needless waste of judicial resources on sufficiently established principles").
169. Ramirez v. State (Ramirez 11), 651 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995).
170. See FLA. STAT. § 90.105(1) (2005). See also Wagner v. State, 864 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2005); Kelly v. State, 824 S.W. 2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); State v.
Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 2002).
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Interestingly, courts do not seem to mind. More so, when proponents
of DNA evidence have failed to meet their burden, courts have not been
lenient, 7 ' suggesting that Frye is still mandatory. Also telling of the
affinity for the standard is that appellate courts have reversed, citing
prejudicial error, where the trial courts have decided not to hold Frye
hearings.172 Even though Frye is not required, courts still rely on the test
when dealing with DNA evidence.
To this end, Florida's judges should not have to sit through lengthy
hearings in which prosecutors and defense attorneys debate the general
acceptance of science that has been utilized for decades.173 Though the
1 74
standards used by Florida's courts cover every aspect of DNA testing,
not all are at issue in every case, and every standard need not be applied
before a court may admit the evidence. 75 Doing so would lead to even
longer, more technically complex hearings, which are not necessarily more
helpful to the judge in determining admissibility. The judge needs to be
comfortable in admitting DNA evidence.
To provide this comfort, the proponent need not reinvent the wheel.
176
Enough courts have admitted DNA as generally accepted and reliable
that all that is truly needed is an expedited review of the laboratory
procedures actually performed and the testimony to be given in the
particular case.177 Because the testimony holds the probative force of the
DNA evidence, as long as the judge is aware of the basis for the expert's
testimony, he or she can make the preliminary7 determination of
admissibility required by the Florida evidence code. 1

171. See, e.g., Perdomo v. State, 829 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (remanded for
further evidentiary hearings to determine the qualifications of the expert). See also Bevil v. State,
875 So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Fla. Ist DCA 2004) (holding error not harmless where state failed to meet
its burden).
172. Arnold v. State, 807 So. 2d 136, 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). See also Roberts v. State, 841
So. 2d 558, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (affirming the Arnold requirement to hold a Frye hearing).
173. Magaletti v. State, 847 So. 2d 523, 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
174. See discussion supra Part V.
175. Most courts are concerned with only one aspect of the DNA testing process. See, e.g.,
Hudson v. State, 820 So. 2d 1070, 1073-74 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (requiring a limited evidentiary
hearing to demonstrate that the witness had the requisite expertise to testify); Perdomo v. State, 829
So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (remanded to determine qualifications of the expert).
176. See discussion supra Part V.
177. See State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 823 n.9 (Minn. 2002) (noting that regardless
of the "overwhelming evidence" of general acceptance, "the established procedure for determining
general acceptance must be followed.").
178. See FLA. STAT. § 90.105(1) (2005) ("Preliminary questions. (1) Except as provided in
subsection (2), the court shall determine preliminary questions concerning the qualification of
a
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In light of the exhaustive Frye testing of DNA, courts should be given
discretion to streamline the admissibility of such evidence. Further, courts
should not feel obligated to hold extensive Frye hearings in every case
involving DNA. Instead, by taking judicial notice that the DNA testing
process is generally accepted as reliable in both the scientific and legal
community, judges can establish legal precedent to this end. This will
simultaneously expedite the admissibility process for trial courts while
reducing the time spent by appellate courts reviewing challenges to lower
court decisions.
In the place ofFrye, a short, pretrial hearing could be held, focusing on
whether the expert is qualified, and whether the tests were performed
correctly. 79 This would give the prosecution the opportunity to lay the
proper foundation while affording the defense a specific avenue to
challenge the evidence. Having a hearing stripped of the unnecessary
hurdles of Frye would satisfy the evidentiary requirements while
preempting the misuse of judicial resources associated with a full-blown
Frye hearing.'80
Foregoing the Frye test for a more streamlined admissibility analysis
is warranted, but this does not suggest that courts should become too
relaxed to their approach. Judges and lawyers are not scientists,18 1 and
DNA evidence is too persuasive 182 to be left unchallenged before it gets to
the jury. On the bright side, with a little help, courts are very capable of
navigating the challenges associated with DNA. Unless the average juror
becomes so well versed in forensic sciences that no expert is needed to
present DNA test results at trial, admissibility standards are necessary to
guide the court in the right direction.

person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence."); see also
FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2005).
Testimony by experts. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion; however, the opinion
is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial.
Id.; cf.FED. R. EVID. 702 (2006).
179. See supra text accompanying note 173. See also discussion supra Part V.
180. Of course, judges and lawyers are not the only ones who are inconvenienced by lengthy
Frye hearings. Forensic lab technicians, who are often the State's expert witness, spend
considerable time away from work for every case in which they testify.
181. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d at 822-23.
182. See supratext accompanying note 13.
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Ultimately, it is important that courts get the chance to shield the jury
from unfairly prejudicial evidence. Along the way, they must be careful
not to get blinded by science themselves.

